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ARTICLES
THE DETENTION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS IN
NORTHERN IRELAND AND GREAT BRITAIN
Brice Dickson *
I. INTRODUCTION
I approach this topic from the perspective of someone who has
lived most of his life in Northern Ireland. At an early age, as most
children do, I developed a commitment to fairness and justice, but
just as I was going through university in the early 1970s my
homeland was convulsed by politically motivated violence. In the
course of six years (1971-76), no fewer than 1660 people were
killed and 17,720 injured, all in an area about the size of Con-
necticut.1 It was a destabilising and disorientating experience,
even though my home was in a small (predominantly Protestant)
town which did not itself experience much trouble. I would watch
the television news about what was going on just ten or fifteen
miles away and feel that it might as well have been happening in
some far distant land. None of my friends or relations, except a
distant cousin, was caught up in the conflict, nor did I have any
strong political views as to whether Northern Ireland should be
British or Irish-like all people born in Northern Ireland, I was
entitled to both nationalities and to me this seemed an advantage
over being just one or the other. What I could not readily compre-
hend was the point of the violence. Whatever the discrimination
* Professor of International and Comparative Law and Director of the Human Rights
Centre at Queen's University Belfast.
1. See Police Service of Northern Ireland, Deaths Due to the Security Situation in
Northern Ireland 1969-2008, http://www.psni.police.uk/deaths-cy.pdf; Police Service of
Northern Ireland, Persons Injured as a Result of the Security Situation in Northern Ire-
land 1968-2008, httpJ/www.psni.police.uk/persons-injuredcey.pdf.
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practised by the Unionist government, how could anyone justify
the killing of completely innocent men, women and children?
Could the perpetrators really believe that such violence would
lead to a political victory? Did the Irish Republican Army ("IRA")2
honestly think it could drive the British out of Northern Ireland
by military might alone? Did the Loyalist paramilitaries, in turn,
think they could make matters better by shooting people whom
they took to be Republican sympathizers? Yet, what also puzzled
me was why the authorities could not control the unrest. Why
could the legal system not firmly come to grips with the situation
by ensuring that those responsible for the violence, from which-
ever side they came, were processed through the courts and given
appropriate sentences?
It was only after I started lecturing in law at Queen's Univer-
sity in 1979 that I began to appreciate the real difficulties facing
the authorities. How does a democratic society "legitimately"
track down those who have committed violence for political ends,
or prevent such violence from being committed in the first place?
Indeed, can the phenomenon of politically motivated violence be
dealt with at all within the framework of the rule of law? This ar-
ticle attempts to tell the story of how the authorities responsible
for governing Northern Ireland went about these tasks by using
the process of detention. It explains how the steps taken in
Northern Ireland related to those taken in Great Britain (i.e.
England, Wales, and Scotland),3 and also how developments
within the United Kingdom ("UK") as a whole significantly im-
pacted Northern Ireland. It tells the story mainly with reference
to the human rights of terrorist suspects, in particular their
rights as guaranteed by the European Convention on Human
Rights ("European Convention").4 The story is one of increasing
2. The Irish Republican Army was the main paramilitary organisation fighting to
"liberate" the whole of Ireland from British rule. See MARIE-THERESE FAY ET AL.,
NORTHERN IRELAND'S TROUBLES: THE HuMAN COSTS 11 (1999).
3. The UK consists of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, although "Britain" is
sometimes used as a synonym for the UK. 29 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 1 (15th
ed. 2002).
4. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. The UK became bound by the European Convention
at the international level in September 1953, but it did not allow individuals to lodge ap-
plications under the Convention until January 1966. See Roger Kerridge, Incorporation of
the European Convention on Human Rights into United Kingdom Domestic Law, in THE
EFFECT ON ENGLISH DOMESTIC LAW OF MEMBERSHIP OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND
OF RATIFICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 247, 247-48 (M.P.
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inventiveness on the part of the authorities as they sought to
tackle terrorism in an effective manner while at the same time
not abusing human rights. They did not always succeed in strik-
ing that balance in a way which satisfied the European Commis-
sion and European Court of Human Rights,5 but by and large
they kept within the constraints of the European Convention as
far as detention is concerned. Today, the problem of terrorism in
Northern Ireland is much less serious than it was in the 1970s
and 1980s,6 but the UK as a whole is under a threat from those
sympathetic to A1-Qaeda that is just as great as, if not far greater
than, that ever presented by the IRA or the Loyalist paramilita-
ries.
The Variety of "Detentions"
Over the years, a number of different forms of detention have
been used to combat terrorism in Northern Ireland. Not all of
them were accompanied by arrests and those that were did not
always result in prosecution and trial. Those that were not ac-
companied with an arrest resulted in either fairly prompt release
from detention or indefinite detention without trial. When judg-
ing whether detention is justified in human rights terms, we need
to be clear about the exact form of detention we have in mind. We
also need to know what the features of the particular form of de-
tention are-not just how long it may last, but also what condi-
tions the detainees will be kept in; what kind of questioning they
Furmston et al. eds., 1983). The Convention did not become part of the domestic law of the
UK until October 2000, when the Human Rights Act 1998 came fully into force. See CLARE
OVEY & ROBIN WHITE, JACOBS AND WHITE: The EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS xiii (3d ed. 2002).
5. These are the bodies based in Strasbourg, France, which were mandated to deal
with applications made by individuals and others against state governments under the
European Convention. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 4, arts. 19, 25, & 45. Formerly, the Commission dealt
with the applications alleging violations of the Convention first, and only some were then
referred to the Court, but in 1998 the Commission was abolished and the Court, which be-
came a full-time body, took over complete responsibility for processing applications. See P.
VAN DIJK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS ix (3d ed. 1998).
6. Dissident Republicans still shoot at police officers and plant bombs, but fortunate-
ly, no member of the security forces has been killed since 1998. However, at least 135 civi-
lians have been killed (by Republicans and Loyalists) since 1998, when the Belfast (Good
Friday) Agreement was signed. See Police Service of Northern Ireland, Deaths Due to the
Security Situation in Northern Ireland 1969-2008, http://www.psni.police.uk/deaths _cy.
pdf.
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will face; what kind of evidence will be admissible resulting from
that questioning; what right of access to lawyers and visitors such
detainees will have; and what opportunities they will be given to
have the legality of their detention reviewed. For the purposes of
exposition, this article examines five kinds of detention, moving
from the most serious to the least serious: (1) detention without
trial (internment); (2) detention pending trial but after charge; (3)
detention pending charge but after arrest; (4) detention at ports
or airports; and (5) detention elsewhere in order to conduct ques-
tioning or searching. Each kind of detention gives rise to its own
legal difficulties, depending on its attendant features.
II. INTERNMENT
Detention without trial, or internment, is the most notorious of
the various kinds of detention. It was used intermittently in
Northern Ireland and in the Irish Free State, later the Republic
of Ireland, from partition onwards (i.e., after 192 1).8 Internment
was resorted to when the authorities felt that they could not deal
with civil unrest through the "ordinary" processes of law and or-
der because, for example, they could not gather enough evidence
from witnesses or informers (on account of the risk of intimida-
tion), or they believed that if the person was not interned he or
she would almost certainly become involved in the commission of
violent acts. This is also the justification for internment that is
maintained during times of war when people are often summarily
locked up because of the risk that they might assist the enemy.
The UK interned people during both World Wars, and the United
States infamously interned Japanese residents of California dur-
ing World War II. The grounds for such internment were often
very easy to satisfy. In the well-known English case of Liversidge
v. Anderson, the House of Lords held, by a vote of four to one, that
the Home Secretary's power to detain someone whom he had
"reasonable cause to believe ... to be of hostile associations" was
7. Some of the material is drawn from the author's forthcoming book. See BRICE
DICKSON, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE CONFLICT IN
NORTHERN IRELAND (forthcoming 2009).
8. See JOHN MCGUFFIN, INTERNMENT 37-78 (1973) (describing the use of internment
in the Republic of Ireland and in Northern Ireland).
9. See, e.g., id. at 26-37 (describing the English use of internment from 1916-1945);
LAST WITNESS: REFLECTIONS ON THE WARTIME INTERNMENT OF JAPANESE (Erica Harth
ed., 2003) (reflecting on the use of internment by the United States).
[Vol. 43:927
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lawful.1 ° Only Lord Atkin dissented." The Supreme Court of the
United States, by a vote of six to three, was equally illiberal in
Korematsu v. United States.12
A. Internment in Northern Ireland
In Northern Ireland, under one of the regulations issued pur-
suant to the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Acts (Northern
Ireland), 1922, a police officer, a soldier, or any other person
authorised by the Minister for Home Affairs could arrest, without
warrant, any person whom he or she suspected of acting, or of
having acted, or of being about to act, in a manner prejudicial to
the preservation of the peace or maintenance of order.13 Regula-
tions 11(2) and (5) provided that persons so arrested could then
be detained indefinitely without trial. 4 Following the outbreak of
politically motivated violence in 1969, the government of North-
ern Ireland invoked this power to intern on 9 August 1971, when
it felt that the civil unrest was too serious to be dealt with
through the ordinary criminal justice process.15 Getting witnesses
to testify in open court against alleged terrorists was proving ex-
tremely difficult, if not impossible, and special courts, where the
accused would not have had to face their accuser in person, would
not have been courts of law at all. The decision was made to
strike as severe a blow as possible against the IRA, putting not
just its leaders out of circulation but also many of its rank and
file members. Some 500 men were therefore targeted on the first
day, rather than just the 100 or so leaders and organizers. 6 In his
statement to the press, the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland,
Brian Faulkner, said: "I ask those who will quite sincerely con-
sider the use of internment powers as evil to answer honestly this
10. [1942] A.C. 206, 213 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
11. Id. at 225-26.
12. 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944) (holding the internment of Japanese citizens constitu-
tional).
13. Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Acts (Northern Ireland), 1956 S.R. & 0.
1956/191, 11(1) (N. Ir.).
14. Id. para. 11(2), (5).
15. BRIAN FAULKNER, MEMOIRS OF A STATESMAN 120-21 (John Houston ed., 1978).
Faulkner, then the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, stated: "I have had to conclude
that the ordinary law cannot deal comprehensively or quickly enough with such ruthless
viciousness." Id. at 121.
16. THE SUNDAY TIMES INSIGHT TEAM, ULSTER 263-67 (1972).
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question; is it more of an evil than to allow the perpetrators of
these outrages to remain at liberty?"17
It was well nigh impossible to challenge internment under
Regulation 11. Nothing in the legislation conferred on persons de-
tained a right to have their detention reviewed.'" While they
could make representations to a non-statutory Advisory Commit-
tee, whatever the Advisory Committee said about their case was
not binding on the government. 9 After the suspension of the
Northern Ireland Parliament in March 1972,20 Westminster
authorised new secondary legislation governing the processing of
internees. The Detention of Terrorists (NI) Order 1972 allowed
the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to make an "interim
custody order," which permitted detention for twenty-eight days.21
But, the Chief Constable could, during that period, refer the case
to a Commissioner requesting the issuance of a "detention order"
permitting indefinite detention.22 Before issuing such an order,
the Commissioner had to offer the detainee an oral hearing,
where he or she would hear the nature of the case to be answered
and could be represented by a lawyer if so desired.23 The Commis-
sioner also had to be satisfied not only that the detainee was in-
volved in the commission of acts of terrorism, but that detention
was necessary for the protection of the public.24 The detainee
could then refer the order to a Detention Appeal Tribunal within
three weeks.
On their face, these safeguards against arbitrary deprivation of
liberty might seem satisfactory, even "quite sophisticated,"26 but a
moment's thought reveals that they fall far short of what the
European Convention requires for such deprivation to be "lawful."
17. FAULKNER, supra note 15, at 121.
18. See Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Acts (Northern Ireland), 1956 S.R. & 0.
1956/191, (N. Ir.).
19. See id. para. 12(1).
20. Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1972, c. 22.
21. Detention of Terrorists (Northern Ireland) Order, 1972, SI 1972/1632 (N. Ir. 15),
art. 4.
22. See id. art. 4(3), 5.
23. Id. art. 5(5), sched., paras. 12(2), 13(2). The right to be represented by counsel was
expressly conferred after the High Court of Northern Ireland had ruled in In re Mackey
that it did not then exist. See Notes of Cases, 23 N.I.L.Q. 111, 113-14 (1972) (describing
the outcome of In re Mackey).
24. Detention of Terrorists Order 1972, art. 5(1).
25. Id. art. 6(1).
26. See DAVID BONNER, EMERGENCY POWERS IN PEACETIME 154 (1985).
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The nearest Article 5 of the Convention comes to permitting such
detentions is in paragraph (1)(c), which allows detention "effected
for the purpose of bringing [the person] before the competent le-
gal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an of-
fence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent
[the person] committing an offence."27 But the Commissioner and
Detention Appeal Tribunal would not have had the independence
and security of tenure required for a legal authority to be "compe-
tent" in this context, and detentions based on mere suspicion
would not have objectively satisfied the criterion of "reasonable
suspicion." This latter point was implicitly recognized by the High
Court of Northern Ireland in two decisions, Re McElduff8 and
Kelly v. Faulkner,29 which effectively held that the only way a de-
tention order could be challenged in a court of law was by show-
ing that it had been made in bad faith.3 °
Internees could not complain to the European Commission of
Human Rights about these breaches of Article 5 of the European
Convention because the UK had validly derogated from the appli-
cation of that Article. On 27 June 1957, the UK had lodged a no-
tice with the Council of Europe declaring that there was a "public
emergency within the meaning of Article 15(1) of the Conven-
tion."31 This notice had never subsequently been withdrawn, even
during the years when internment was not practised. From time
to time, the UK government notified the Secretary General of the
Council of Europe of relevant developments. On 25 September
1969, for example, it informed the Secretary General thus:
27. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (as amended by Protocol No. 11, Nov. 1, 1998), art. 5(1)(c) [here-
inafter European Convention on Human Rights].
28. [1972] N. Ir. L.R. 1. Justice McGonigal, relying on Liversidge v. Anderson, [1942]
A.C. 206 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.), held it was not open to the court to in-
quire into the reasonableness of the belief or decision of a minister of the Crown when
making a detention order. Id. at 17-19. For a discussion of Liversidge, see supra note 10
and accompanying text. In both the UK and Ireland, this was the era of profound judicial
deference to executive discretion.
29. [19731 N. Ir. L.R. 31.
30. In re McElduff, [1972] N. Ir. L.R. at 20 (per McGonigal, J.); Faulkner, [1973] N. Ir.
L.R. at 35 (per Gibson, J.).
31. STANDING ADVISORY COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS BY LAW IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1977, Cmnd. 7009, at 103 [hereinafter STANDING
ADVISORY COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS]. For all of the UK's notices of derogation from
1957 to 1975, see id. at 103-07.
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Serious civil disturbances have occurred in various parts of Northern
Ireland in the month of August this year as a result of which the
Government of Northern Ireland has found it necessary to exercise
certain of such emergency powers, to the extent strictly required by
the exigencies of the situation. In the course of that month twenty-
four persons were detained in custody without judicial process. Four
of such persons have been charged with criminal offences, and the
remainder were released from detention within, at most, 14 days of
their being first detained'.2
Likewise, on 20 August 1971, the UK government informed the
Secretary General as follows:
Over recent months in Northern Ireland there has been a series of
acts of terrorism, including murders, attempted murders, maimings,
bombings, fire-raising and acts of intimidation, and more recently
violent civil disturbances. The Government of Northern Ireland has
therefore found it necessary since 9 August for the protection of life
and the security of property and to prevent outbreaks of public dis-
order, to exercise, to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of
the situation, powers of detention and internment.
33
Part of the European Court's function is to ensure that deroga-
tion notices are justifiable and that the measures taken under
them are, in the terms provided in Article 15(1), "strictly required
by the exigencies of the situation" and "not inconsistent with [the
state's] other obligations under international law."34 But when
the government of Ireland controversially brought a case against
the British government on this point in Strasbourg, both the Eu-
ropean Commission and the European Court rejected its argu-
ments." The Court said that the existence of the public emergen-
cy was "perfectly clear from the facts"36 and that the UK
authorities "were reasonably entitled to consider that normal leg-
islation offered insufficient resources for the campaign against
terrorism and that recourse to measures outside the scope of the
ordinary law, in the shape of extrajudicial deprivation of liberty,
32. Id. at 103.
33. Id. at 104.
34. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 27, art. 15(1), see also id. art.
19 (establishing the European Court of Human Rights).
35. See Republic of Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 28-29, 93-94
(1978) (Court decision); Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 95-99 (Jan. 25,
1976) (Commission report), available at http://www.echr.coe.int (follow "Case-Law" hyper-
link; then follow the "HUDOC" icon; then check the box "Reports" under "ECHR Document
Collections"; then search "Application Number" for "5310/71").
36. Republic of Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 91.
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was called for."37 This decision was issued in January 1978, more
than six years after the detention power had been authorised."8
The last internee had actually been released more than two years
earlier, in December 1975."9 So, it was not as if an adverse finding
by the European Court against the UK's use of internment would
have driven a coach and horses through current UK practice in
relation to the control of terrorism in Northern Ireland. The fact
that the European Court upheld the use of internment is greatly
to be regretted.
B. Internment in England
The decision to end detention without trial in Northern Ireland
did not mean, however, that the UK could then withdraw its no-
tice of derogation. The derogation had to be kept in place because
other "emergency" powers of arrest enacted by the British Par-
liament still applied, and these powers authorised arrests on
grounds of mere suspicion, rather than reasonable suspicion.40
When this anomaly was mostly corrected in 1984, Parliament
withdrew the derogation notice 1.4 But in 1988, it became clear
that the detention provisions were still in breach of Article 5 be-
cause they allowed arrested persons to be held for up to seven
days before being brought before a judge.4 ' Therefore, Parliament
almost immediately reimposed the derogation, and it was not un-
til the seven-day detention scheme was altered by the Terrorism
Act 2000-which Parliament passed in July 20004 3-that the UK
government was able to notify the Council of Europe that it was
at last withdrawing its notice of derogation in relation to terror-
ism connected with Northern Ireland.4
37. Id. at 93-94.
38. Id. at 25.
39. See CAIN Web Service, Internment-A Chronology of the Main Events, http://cain.
ulst.ac.uk/events/intern/chron.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2009).
40. See Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1973, c. 53, §§ 10(1), 11(1),
12(1).
41. See Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1984, c. 8, § 12(1). A
comparable change was eventually made to section 13 of the Northern Ireland (Emergency
Provisions) Act 1978. See Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1987, c. 30, §
25(1), sched. 1, para. 1.
42. See Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984, §§ 12(4)-(5).
43. See Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 41(3).
44. Human Rights Act (Amendment) Order, 2001, S.I. 2001/1216, art. 4 (U.K).
2009]
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Within a year, however, the UK government again contacted
the Council of Europe with a fresh notice of derogation because it
had decided, in the wake of the events in the United States on 11
September 2001, to reintroduce internment for a certain category
of person anywhere in the UK.45 Section 23 of the Anti-terrorism,
Crime and Security Act 2001 authorised internment for non-
British nationals in the UK who were reasonably suspected of in-
volvement in terrorism, but against whom there was not enough
admissible evidence to convict them in court.46 The UK govern-
ment actually blamed the European Court of Human Rights for
leaving it with no alternative but to introduce internment.47 In
Chahal v. United Kingdom, the European Court had ruled that, if
a state were to deport a person to a country where there was a
substantial risk that the person would be subjected to treatment
contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention, the deportation
itself would be a breach of Article 3.4
The compatibility of section 23 with the UK's obligations under
the European Convention came before the country's highest
court, the House of Lords, in December 2004. 4' For only the third
time in its history, the House convened a bench of nine Lords of
Appeal, rather than the more common five or seven, thus indicat-
ing the importance of the case.5 ° With only one dissent, the House
held that section 23 was not compatible with the European Con-
vention because denying people their liberty indefinitely was
"disproportionate" to the threat faced, and limiting indefinite de-
45. Human Rights Act 1998 (Designated Derogation) Order, 2001, S.I. 2001/3644,
sched. (U.K.).
46. See Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, § 23(1) (U.K.).
47. See Prime Minister Tony Blair, Press Conference (Aug. 5, 2005), available at
http://www.numberlO.gov.uk/Page8041.
48. Chahal v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413, 446 (1996) (Court decision).
Article 3 imposes an absolute ban on torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment. See European Convention of Human Rights, supra note 27, art. 3. The UK gov-
ernment has been lobbying to have the ruling in Chahal reversed and meanwhile has
adopted the tactic of striking "Memoranda" with particular countries (such as Jordan and
Libya) whereby persons deported to these countries from Britain will be assured that they
will not be ill-treated. See JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE UN CONVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE (UNCAT), 2005-6, H.L./H.C.-19, at 10-13, 35-36.
49. A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68, 90, 95
(appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
50. The two previous occasions were Attorney General's Reference (No. 2 of 2001)
[2003] UKHL 68, [2004] 2 A.C. 72, 72 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.), and R v. Ball,
[1911] A.C. 47 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
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tention to non-British people was racially discriminatory.51 The
decision was a hammer-blow to the government's anti-terrorism
strategy and must have been a shock to the Home Secretary be-
cause there was a good chance that even the European Court of
Human Rights would not have gone so far in questioning the le-
gitimacy of the government's stance on this matter. In February
2005, the government allowed section 23 to lapse and in its place
provided for "control orders" to be issued in relation to persons
(whether British or non-British) suspected of international terror-
ism who could not otherwise be tried or deported.52 The House of
Lords considered examples of these control orders in 2007: two
were confirmed as compliant with European Convention rights
while one was not.53 One of the crucial factors was the number of
hours per day the controlee in question was required to stay in-
side his or her home. The House suggested that up to sixteen
hours was probably acceptable, but longer than that was not.54
Most commentators agree that the use of internment in North-
ern Ireland was a disaster because it ensured continuous enlist-
ment in the IRA.55 The amount of violence also rose during the
period of its use, but, of course, no one can say how high the level
of violence might have reached had there not been internment. 6
The safeguards in place to ensure that no one was interned with-
out a genuine and reasonable suspicion of involvement in terror-
ism were inadequate, and the rights given to internees as regards
contact with family and friends were negligible. Some men were
interned for more than three years and must have been marked
by the experience for life.57 Likewise, most would agree that re-
sorting to internment in the wake of 9/11 was a public relations
51. A, [2005] 2 A.C. at 127; see Brice Dickson, Law Versus Terrorism: Can Law Win?,
2005 EUR. H. RTs. L. REV. 1 (2005); David Dyzenhaus, An Unfortunate Outburst of Anglo-
Saxon Parochialism, 68 M.L.R. 673 (2005); Adam Tomkins, Readings of A v. Secretary of
State for the Home Department, [2005] Pub. L. 259 (U.K).
52. Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2, §§ 1-4.
53. See Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't v. E [20071 UKHL 45, [20081 1 A.C. 499, 553
(appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (control order compliant); Sec'y of State for the Home
Dep't v. JJ [2007] UKHL 45, [2008] 1 A.C. 385, 406, 415-16 (appeal taken from Eng.)
(U.K.) (control order not compliant); Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't v. MB [2007] UKHL
46, [2008] 1 A.C. 440, 469-70 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (control order compliant).
54. See JJ, [2008] 1 A.C. at 437-38 (opinion of Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood).
55. See, e.g., KEVIN BOYLE, ET AL., LAW AND STATE: THE CASE OF NORTHERN IRELAND
75-77 (1975).
56. See, e.g., MERLYN REES, NORTHERN IRELAND: A PERSONAL PERSPECTIVE 232, 245
(1985).
57. See DENIS FAUL & RAYMOND MURRAY, THE SHAME OF MERLYN REES 5 (1975).
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disaster, notwithstanding the revulsion felt throughout the coun-
try at the mindless violence of Al-Qaeda. It is not unlikely that
such internment radicalised a further cohort of terrorists, some of
them home-grown. In July 2005, it was four young British
Islamists who killed themselves and fifty-two other people with
bombs they set off on London's public transport system.58
III. PRE-TRIAL DETENTION
Throughout the conflict in Northern Ireland, there was little
controversy about how long people were kept in custody pending
their trial. In the 1970s and 1980s, the norm was that any person
charged with a serious offence would be unlikely to be released on
bail pending his or her trial. But with the advent of a more hu-
man rights-aware judiciary, the practice regarding bail began to
change in the 1990s, and since the Human Rights Act 1998 came
into force, the onus of showing why bail should not be granted has
been placed on the prosecution.5 9 There has not, however, been
any significant case law in relation to bail decisions regarding
persons charged with terrorist offences, but one analogous case
did go as far as the European Court of Human Rights.
In McKay v. United Kingdom, the court addressed the provi-
sion in the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973-
and in all subsequent incarnations of that Act-whereby a person
charged with a "scheduled" offence (i.e. one likely to have been
committed by a member of a paramilitary organization) could be
admitted to bail only by a High Court judge, not a magistrate."
The rationale behind this rule, which was introduced following
the report of the Diplock Commission in 1972,61 was that allowing
magistrates to make such decisions would expose them to too
much danger-they could be targeted by Republican paramilita-
ries and, given the number of magistrates, they could not be easi-
58. Britain "Defiant" as Bombers Kill 52 in Attack on the Heart of London, TIMES
(London), July 8, 2005, at Home News 2.
59. JOHN WADHAM ET AL., BLACKSTONE'S GUIDE TO THE HuMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 pa-
ra. 8.136 (4th ed. 2007).
60. 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 827, 831 (2007) (Court decision); see Northern Ireland (Emer-
gency Provisions) Act, 1973, c. 53, § 3(1).
61. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION To CONSIDER LEGAL PROCEDURES To DEAL WITH
TERRORIST ACTvrIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1972, Cmnd. 5185.
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ly protected against such attacks.62 Because there were only a few
High Court judges, and these received round-the-clock personal
protection, it was deemed wiser to task them with the responsibil-
ity of deciding whether or not to grant bail to terrorist suspects.
Mark McKay, having been arrested on 6 January 2001 on sus-
picion of having carried out a robbery of a petrol station, admitted
his guilt the next day and was officially charged with the of-
fence." On 8 January 2001, he appeared in a magistrates' court
and applied for release on bail.64 The police gave evidence that the
robbery was not connected with terrorism and that they would
have no objection to bail being granted.65 The magistrate, howev-
er, indicated that he did not have the power to order Mr. McKay's
release because the offence in question was a scheduled offence.66
Later that same day, Mr. McKay applied to the High Court for
bail, which was granted the next day.67 He immediately applied
for judicial review, seeking a declaration that the anti-terrorist
legislation was incompatible with Articles 5 and 14 of the Euro-
pean Convention.6" On 3 May, three weeks after McKay had been
sentenced-to two years detention in a young offenders' institu-
tion followed by a year of probation-Justice Kerr rejected his
judicial review application.69 The judge, the Divisional Court, and
the House of Lords all refused leave to appeal any further.7 °
62. See McKay, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 831. A magistrate was, in fact, murdered in 1973,
and another in 1974. See Brice Dickson, Northern Ireland's Troubles and the Judges, in
NORTHERN IRELAND: POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 135 (Brigid Hadfield ed., 1992).
Three other more senior judges were also killed in the Northern Ireland conflict (in 1974,
1983, and 1987). Id.
63. McKay, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 829.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. (citing Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 67(2) and Northern Ireland (Emergency
Provisions) Act, 1996, c. 22, § 3(2)). The Terrorism Act 2000, section 67(2), replaced section
3(2) of the Emergency Provisions Act 1996. See Terrorism Act 2000, § 67(2). McKay's
crime, robbery, was only a scheduled offence if it involved the use of any explosive, fire-
arm, imitation firearm, or weapon of offence. See Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions)
Act 1996, sched. 1, para. 10(b) & Note 3(a). This section was also replaced by the Terror-
ism Act 2000. See Terrorism Act 2000, sched. 9, para. 10(b) & Note 3(a). The Terrorism Act
2000, section 67(2), replaced section 3(2) of the Emergency Provisions Act 1996. See Ter-
rorism Act 2000, § 67(2).
67. McKay, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 830.
68. Id. at 830.
69. See In the Matter of an Application by Mark McKay for Judicial Review, [2002]
NIQB 31 (N. Ir.), available at http://www.courtsni.gov.uk/en-gb/judicial+decisions/janjune
02/jj_kerc3700.htm. (follow "kerc3700" hyperlink).
70. McKay, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 830.
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After the application was held admissible by the European
Court, it was deemed important enough to be referred to a Grand
Chamber of seventeen judges rather than to a mere Chamber of
seven judges. 71 The Grand Chamber then held by sixteen votes to
one that there had been no breach of Article 5(3) of the European
Convention.72 Citing its earlier decision in TW v. Malta,73 the
Court acknowledged that Article 5(3) conferred two distinct rights
which were "not on their face logically or temporally linked. 74 On
the facts of the case before it, the Court stressed that "[n]o ele-
ment of possible abuse or arbitrariness ar[ose] from the fact that
it was another tribunal or judge" that considered whether to re-
lease the applicant, nor from the fact that considering release of
the applicant depended on the applicant himself requesting it.
75
In addition, the Court stated, it did not appear that the system
prevented weak or vulnerable people from taking such an initia-
tive.76 Even though the applicant was in effect detained for a day
longer than he otherwise would have been, "the procedure in this
case was conducted with due expedition, leading to his release
some three days after his arrest."77
Five of the judges, while concurring in the ultimate result, dif-
fered from the majority in that they placed more emphasis on
"the principle laid down in Art. 5(1) of the European Convention,
read in conjunction with Art. 5(3): at the pre-trial stage an ar-
rested person has the right to prompt and full judicial control and
the right to be set free immediately unless there are still suffi-
cient grounds to keep him [or her] in custody."7 ' These five judges
concurred in the result only because Mr. McKay had been re-
leased less than thirty-six hours after his arrest, which was with-
in the maximum period of four days allowed for pre-charge deten-
tions by the European Court.9 Under the circumstances, there-
71. See id. at 827.
72. Id. at 839.
73. 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 185 (1999) (Court decision).
74. McKay, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 834 (citing TW, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 205). The two
rights were, first, to be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law
to exercise judicial power and, second, to be tried within a reasonable time or to be re-
leased pending trial. Id. at 834, 837.
75. Id. at 838.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 838-39.
78. Id. at 839, 841 (joint separate opinion of Judges Rozakis, Tulkens, Botoucharova,
Myjer, and Ziemele).
79. Id. at 841-42; see Brogan v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 117, 135-36
[Vol. 43:927
DETENTION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS
fore, the requirements of promptness and speediness had been
satisfied.
The only judge who fully dissented was Judge Jebens from
Norway."° In his view, the speedy release of the applicant made
no difference: McKay had instructed his solicitors to apply for re-
lease on bail, and a request to that effect was actually put before
the magistrate." "Furthermore," Judge Jebens argued, "the police
officer who appeared in the magistrates' court had no objection to
bail, provided that proper conditions were set." 2
Alongside the move towards a presumption in favour of bail,
there has been a trend towards devising time limits for the pre-
trial period. In England and Wales, under regulations issued pur-
suant to section 22 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, trials
of indictable offences should take place within 182 days (i.e., six
months) of the defendant's first appearance before a magistrate. 3
But, the time limit can be extended if the prosecution can show
that there is good and sufficient cause for doing so and that it has
acted with all due diligence and expedition to date. 4 In Northern
Ireland, however, no such time limits have been set, and Crown
Court trials frequently begin much longer than six months after
the defendant's first appearance before a magistrate. But the
European Convention is not very demanding on this front-it
simply says in Article 6(1) that any person charged with a crimi-
nal offence is entitled to a trial "within a reasonable time." 5 In-
deed, it might be in the defendant's best interests not to be tried
too quickly, and Article 6(3)(b) recognizes this by conferring on
everyone who is charged with a criminal offence the right "to
have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his [or
her] defence." 6 Article 5(3) also confers the right to be tried
within a reasonable time, but posits as an acceptable alternative
(1988) (Court decision) (finding four days and six hours to violate the European Conven-
tion). For a discussion of Brogan, see infra notes 114-31 and accompanying text.
80. McKay, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 843 (Jebens, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 844.
82. Id.
83. Prosecution of Offences (Custody Time Limits) (Amendment) Regulations, 2000,
S.I. 2000/3284, para. 2 (U.K.).
84. Prosecution of Offences Act, 1985, c. 23 § 22(3); Crime and Disorder Act 1998, c.
37, § 43(2).
85. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 27, art. 6(1).
86. Id. art. 6(3)(b).
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the release of the defendant pending trial, an action that Article
6(1) does not envisage.87
On the basis of the discussion of the two issues examined in
this part, we can conclude that the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights allows European states considerable leeway concern-
ing the allocation to special judges of the power to grant bail to
terrorist suspects and delays in the trial of terrorist suspects. In a
recent case involving the German legal system, the European
Court of Human Rights emphasised that when the accused is a
suspected terrorist, the Court is prepared to tolerate longer de-
lays than in other cases." In the case before it, the applicant had
been accused of having prepared, with others, a bomb attack at
the "La Belle" discotheque in Berlin on 5 April 1986, aimed at
members of the American armed forces.8 9 The bomb killed three
people and seriously injured 104 others. 90 The applicant's pre-
trial detention lasted five years and almost six months, but the
European Court found this to be reasonable because, amongst
other reasons, his case was "extremely complex," there were four
co-defendants and 169 witnesses, and there were "difficulties in-
trinsic to the prosecution of offences committed in the context of
international terrorism."91 The Court did not specify, however,
why terrorism is any more likely than, say, serious organized
crime, to require lengthier pre-trial detention.
IV. PRE-CHARGE DETENTION
A. Legislating for Pre-Charge Detention
Article 5(3) of the European Convention states that everyone
who has been arrested or detained for the purpose of being
brought before a competent legal authority on reasonable suspi-
cion of having committed an offence (or because arrest or deten-
tion was reasonably considered necessary to prevent commission
of an offence or subsequent flight) has the right to be brought
promptly before a judge or other legally authorised judicial offi-
87. See id. art. 5(3).
88. See Chraidi v. Germany, 47 Eur. H.R. Rep. 47, 54-55 (2006) (Court decision).
89. Id. at 50.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 54, 56.
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cer.9 2 Two main questions arise from this provision: what does
"promptly" mean and how soon must a defendant be charged or
released after first appearing before a judicial officer?
As we have seen, the Special Powers Acts that applied in
Northern Ireland from 1922 to 1973 allowed for internment to be
introduced by ministerial regulation. 93 But it did not otherwise
extend the time during which people arrested on suspicion of hav-
ing committed specific offences could be detained prior to being
brought before a judge.94 The so-called "ordinary" law applied in
such situations. Until 1990, by virtue of section 132 of the Magis-
trates' Courts Act (NI) 1964, the ordinary law allowed detention
after arrest for just twenty-four hours, but that period could be
extended to forty-eight hours at the discretion of a senior police
officer.95 Only then did the arrested person have to be brought be-
fore a court.96 The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act
1973 ("EPA 1973"), which replaced the Special Powers Acts,
authorised the detention of persons arrested under section 10(1)
for a maximum of seventy-two hours.97 The rationale was that it
might take longer than forty-eight hours for the Secretary of
State to decide to make an interim custody order in relation to
the person arrested-the first step in the formal internment proc-
ess.9" The EPA 1973, in section 11(1), conferred a further arrest
power on the police, but it did not extend the maximum period
during which an arrested person could be detained without being
brought before a court, so in these circumstances that period re-
mained at forty-eight hours.99
While internment was phased out two years after the EPA
1973 came into force, the power of arrest conferred by section 10
remained in effect. 100 It was a much more general power than that
92. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 27, art. 5(3).
93. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
94. See Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Acts (Northern Ireland), 1956 S.R. & 0.
1956/191 (N. Ir.).
95. Magistrates' Courts Act (Northern Ireland) 1964, c. 21, § 132.
96. Id.
97. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1973, c. 53, § 10(3).
98. See id. sched. 1, para. 11.
99. Id. § 11(1) (authorising the warrantless arrest of a person suspected of "commit-
ting, having committed or being about to commit a scheduled offence or an offence under
this Act which is not a scheduled offence").
100. See REES, supra note 56, at 246-48 (discussing end of internment); see also North-
ern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973, § 10.
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conferred by section 11, so police officers resorted to it as a matter
of course. 101 But this meant that the section 10 power was being
used for a purpose for which it was never intended and people
were being arrested without the police having to show that they
were suspected of any specific offence-suspicion of being a ter-
rorist was enough. It also meant that people who were arrested
could be detained for up to seventy-two hours prior to being
brought before a court. 102 Almost by stealth, the ordinary law's
standard on being brought "promptly" before a court was thereby
subverted.
In the wake of a series of pub bombings by the IRA in England
in 1974,103 Westminster enacted the Prevention of Terrorism
(Temporary Provisions) Act 1974 ("PTA 1974"), which conferred a
further arrest power on the police. 10 4 For some reason, this power
was included in a part of the Act that extended to the whole UK,
not just England, Wales and Scotland.1°' This meant that the po-
lice in Northern Ireland had a third arrest power at their dis-
posal, one which was really an amalgam of the two existing pow-
ers in terms of the grounds which could be used to justify the
arrest.06
101. See Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973, §§ 10, 11. Section 10 al-
lowed a police constable to arrest "without warrant any person whom he suspects of being
a terrorist." See id. § 10. Section 11 allowed arrest without warrant of "any person whom
he suspects of committing, having committed or being about to commit a scheduled offence
or an offence under this Act which is not a scheduled offence." Id. § 11.
102. See id. § 10(3).
103. In October 1974, five people were killed in a Guilford bombing. See DAVID
MCKITTRICK ET AL., LOST LIVES: THE STORIES OF THE MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN WHO
DIED AS A RESULT OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND TROUBLES 479-82 (1999). In November of
that same year, two were killed in Woolwich and twenty-one in Birmingham. See id. at
490, 496-500, 504.
104. See Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1974, c. 56, § 7. Section 7
authorised warrantless arrests of persons reasonably suspected of: 1) being guilty of an
offence under section 1 of the Act (dealing with proscribed organisations) or section 3 of
the Act (dealing with exclusion orders); 2) being "concerned in the commission, prepara-
tion or instigation of acts of terrorism"; or 3) being subject to an exclusion order. See id.
105. Part I of the Act, dealing with proscribed organisations, did not apply to Northern
Ireland. See id. § 13(2).
106. Compare id. § 7, with Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973, § 11(1)
(granting the power to arrest those suspected of "committing, having committed, or being
about to commit a scheduled offence"), and Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Acts (North-
ern Ireland), 1956 S.R. & 0. 1956/191, 11(1) (N. Ir.) (granting the power to arrest those
suspected of "acting or of having acted or of being about to act in a manner prejudicial to
the preservation of the peace or maintenance of order").
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In addition to providing an additional power of arrest, the PTA
1974 altered the permitted length of detention. Section 7(2) said
that a person arrested under section 7(1) could not be detained
for more than forty-eight hours, but it allowed the police to apply
to the Secretary of State for permission to extend the detention
period by up to five days.10 7 This meant that arrested persons
could be held in police custody for a total of seven days before
having any right to appear before a court. While this was not as
bad as the internment provisions that still operated in Northern
Ireland at that time (though only for another twelve months), it
was otherwise a draconian step to take within Great Britain. It
authorised a form of "mini-internment.',10
8
Given the panic to enact the PTA, it is perhaps understandable
that little attention was paid to the provisions which allowed
executive detention for up to seven days. In the debates in
Parliament, no one mentioned the requirement in Article 5(3) of
the European Convention that arrested persons must be brought
"promptly" before a judicial officer.10 9 Instead, Parliament as-
sumed that a seven-day delay would not breach this requirement.
At the same time, the British government failed to consider that
a derogation notice, similar to those lodged with the Council of
Europe some years earlier in relation to the emergency in North-
ern Ireland, was needed to "excuse" the PTA provisions.1  The
first three of those notices-submitted in 1957, 1969 and 1971-
had referred to actions taken by the government of Northern Ire-
land, while the last four-submitted in 1973 and 1975, two in
each year-had referred to laws passed at Westminster which
applied only in Northern Ireland and not elsewhere in the UK."'
No notice of derogation, however, was issued when the PTA 1974
was enacted. The UK government, in failing to issue such a no-
tice, may have been relying on earlier findings by the European
Commission of Human Rights. First, in a 1966 case concerning
107. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974, § 7(2).
108. See 204 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1992) 725 (statement of Mr. McGrady discuss-
ing the use of prolonged detention). The reports of this, and all, Parliamentary debates-
from both the House of Commons and the House of Lords-are available at the Parlia-
ment's webpage. See UK Parliament, Publications, http://www.parliament.uk/publications
(last visited Feb. 20, 2009).
109. See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 4, art. 5(3).
110. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
111. See STANDING ADVISORY COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 31 at 103-
07.
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ordinary criminal offences, the Commission found that a period of
four days satisfied the requirement of promptness in Article
5(3).112 Then, in a 1972 case, it found that a period of five days
was acceptable.
113
B. Challenging the Pre-Charge Detention System
A challenge to the PTA detention system was nevertheless
lodged by four men who had been detained in Northern Ireland in
1984 for periods ranging from four days and six hours to six days
and sixteen-and-a-half hours. 1 4 They applied to Strasbourg just a
few weeks after being released from detention without charge."
5
At the level of the European Commission, a majority drew the di-
viding line somewhere between four days and eleven hours, which
they said was acceptable, and five days and eleven hours, which
they said was not. 116 Consequently, they upheld by ten votes to
two the applications of two of the men but rejected by eight votes
to four the applications of the two others."7 Four prominent
members of the Commission thought that all of the applications
should have been upheld."1
8
The case was then considered by the European Court, which on
29 November 1988 held by twelve votes to seven that Article 5(3)
112. X v. Netherlands, App No 2894/66, 1966 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 564, 568 (Eur.
Comm'n on H.R.).
113. See Brogan v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 11209/84, 11234/84, 11266/84, 11386/85,
para. 103 (1987) (Commission report) [hereinafter Brogan Commission report], available
at http://www.echr.coe.int (follow "Case-Law" hyperlink; then follow the "HUDOC" icon;
then check the box "Reports" under "ECHR Document Collections"; then search "Case
Title" for "Brogan") (citing X v. Belgium, 42 Collection of Decisions 49 (Commission Deci-
sion, July 19, 1972)).
114. See Brogan v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 117, 120-21 (1988) (Court deci-
sion) [hereinafter Brogan Court decision].
115. See id. at 120-21, 127. The applicants had been released between 22 September
and 7 October 1984. Id. at 120-21. They lodged their applications between 18 October
1984 and 8 February 1985. Id. at 127.
116. Brogan Commission report, supra note 113, paras. 105-07.
117. Id. para. 108. There were corresponding findings regarding whether Article 5(5)
(the right to compensation) had been breached, although one of the Commissioners who
held that Article 5(3) had been breached in relation to Brogan and Coyle then held that
Article 5(5) had not been breached. See id. paras. 119, 124.
118. Id. (Comm'rs Frowein, Trechsel, Schermers, and Thune, partly dissenting). On the
other hand, the UK Commissioner, Sir Basil Hall, felt unable to join his fellow Commis-
sioners in condemning the UK government in any way. Id. (Comm'r Hall, partly dissent-
ing).
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had been breached in relation to all four applicants, 19 a rare ex-
ample of the European Court going further than the Commission
in protecting human rights. 2 ' Like the Commission, the Court
acknowledged that the investigation of terrorist offences undoub-
tedly presented the authorities with "special problems."12' It took
"full judicial notice of the factors adverted to by the [UK] govern-
ment" in this regard and noted that in Northern Ireland, "the re-
ferral of police requests for extended detention to the Secretary of
State and the individual scrutiny of each police request by a Mi-
nister do provide a form of executive control."'22 The Court also
took into account that the UK Parliament constantly monitored
the need for the continuation of the special powers and their op-
eration was regularly subjected to independent reviews. 2 3 The
Court even accepted that "the context of terrorism in Northern
Ireland [had] the effect of prolonging the period during which the
authorities [could]... keep a person suspected of serious terrorist
offences in custody before bringing him [or her] before a judge or
other judicial officer."'24 Nevertheless, despite all these "conces-
sions," the European Court held that
To attach such importance to the special features of this case as to
justify so lengthy a period of detention without appearance before a
judge or other judicial officer would be an unacceptably wide inter-
pretation of the plain meaning of the word "promptly." An interpre-
119. See Brogan Court decision, supra note 114 at 136 (majority opinion); id. at 139
(Vilhjdlmsson, Bindschedler-Robert, Golcikli, Matscher, Valticos, JJ., dissenting); id. at
43 (Evans, J., dissenting); id. at 146 (Martens, J., dissenting). By a vote of 13 to 6, the
Court held that article 5(5) had also been breached in relation to each applicant. See id. at
138 (majority opinion); id. at 146 (Martens, J., dissenting) (dissenting only from holding
under article 5(3)); id. at 141 (Vilhjdlmsson, Bindschedler-Robert, Golcuiklui, Matscher,
Valticos, JJ., dissenting); id. at 146 (Evans, J., dissenting).
120. On this phenomenon see Adam Tomkins, Civil Liberties in the Council of Europe:
A Critical Survey, in EUROPEAN CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 1, 23 (C.A. Gearty ed., 1997) ("If all the cases
where the Court and Commission have come to different conclusions as to whether or not
there has been a violation of the Convention are listed, up to the end of 1990 that list
would contain 52 cases. In only 12 of these 52 cases did the Court find a violation where
the Commission did not, and in the remaining 40 the Court found no violation whereas the
Commission did."). Tomkins lists the 12 cases, only two of which were against the UK-
Brogan and Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439 (1989) (Court decision). See
id. n.50. The author is unaware of any study of the number of occasions on which the
Court differed from the Commission in the period from 1990 until the Commission's aboli-
tion in 1998.
121. Brogan Court decision, supra note 114, at 135.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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tation to this effect would import into Article 5(3) a serious weaken-
ing of a procedural guarantee to the detriment of the individual and
would entail consequences . . . impairing the very essence of the
right protected by this provision.
125
Seven judges dissented from the ruling in Brogan.126 Six of
them wrote a joint dissenting opinion saying that "[i]n view of the
exceptional situation in Northern Ireland," and given that a pe-
riod of four days was acceptable in normal situations, it seemed
reasonable to regard periods of detention for less than a week as
acceptable.127 According to these judges, "Such a view fits in with
the case law and is justified by the wholly exceptional conditions
obtaining in Northern Ireland." 2 ' Sir Vincent Evans, the UK
judge, delivered a separate dissenting opinion in which he
pointed out that "more than 30,000 persons [had] been killed,
maimed or injured [in Northern Ireland] as a direct result of ter-
rorist activity in the [previous] twenty years."'29 He also noted
that in the preceding year, 1987, thirty-nine of the eighty-three
persons detained in excess of five days had been charged with se-
rious terrorist offences.131 Judge Evans added that Viscount Col-
ville QC, in his 1987 report on the operation of the PTA 1984, had
concluded that if a High Court judge (as opposed to a government
minister) were asked to grant extensions to detention, it would
have to be done in camera without any effective representation of
the detainee-a procedure that "could lead to unanswerable criti-
cisms of the judiciary."1 31
The Court's decision in Brogan undoubtedly came as a surprise
to the British government, and it quickly had to decide how to
react. It opted again for officially derogating from the European
125. Id. at 135-36. In a separate judgment, delivered on 30 May 1989, the Court held
unanimously that no compensation should be awarded to any of the applicants. Brogan v.
United Kingdom, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439, 439-40 (1989) (Court decision). By way of exem-
plary damages, they had each claimed £2,000 per hour of excess detention. Brogan Court
decision, supra note 114 at 139.
126. Brogan Court decision, supra note 114, at 139 (Vilhjdlmsson, Bindschedler-Robert,
G6lciklti, Matscher, Valticos, JJ., dissenting); id. at 143 (Evans, J., dissenting); id. at 146
(Martens, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 140 (Vilhjdlmsson, Bindschedler-Robert, GilcUkli, Matscher, and Valticos,
JJ., dissenting).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 144 (Evans, J., partly dissenting).
130. Id. at 145.
131. Id.
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Convention.'32 It had lifted its previous derogation more than four
years earlier, when it made the emergency arrest powers depen-
dent not just on "suspicion" but on reasonable suspicion."'33 The
post-Brogan derogation was imposed specifically to allow ex-
tended detention periods. In a later case, two men-Peter Bran-
nigan and Patrick McBride, both of whom had been detained for
more than four days in Northern Ireland-challenged the legality
of the government's derogation notice itself."' However, both the
Commission (by eight votes to five) and the Court (by twenty-two
votes to four) held that it was valid.135 Finding there to be a public
emergency in Northern Ireland and that the derogation was re-
quired by the "exigencies of the situation," the Court held that the
derogation complied with the European Convention.'36 In dissent,
several of the judges rejected the Government's arguments that,
in the interests of independence and the preservation of secrecy,
judges should be excluded from determining the length of deten-
tion.137 However minimal the judicial safeguards, they said, some
judicial control is better than none. 3 '
There matters rested for the remainder of the 1990s, even
though the level of violence in Northern Ireland declined consi-
derably during that decade. From 1993 to 1999, annual reviews of
the operation of the PTA 1989 were conducted by John Rowe
132. See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, sched. 3, pt. I (repealed by Human Rights Act
1998 (Amendment) Order, 2001, S.I. 2001/1216 (U.K.)).
133. In August 1984, the UK withdrew its derogation from the European Convention.
See Council of Europe, Information Bulletin on Legal Activities Within the Council of Eu-
rope and in Member States, vol. 21, p. 2 (1985). By bringing itself back under article 5(1)(c)
of the European Convention, the UK agreed to require reasonable suspicion. See European
Convention of Human Rights, supra note 27, art. 5(1)(b); see also supra notes 40-41 and
accompanying text.
134. Brannigan & McBride v. United Kingdom, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 539, 567-68 (1993)
(Court decision) [hereinafter Brannigan Court decision].
135. Brannigan & McBride v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 14553/89, 14554/89, at 20
(1991) (Commission report), available at http://www.echr.coe.int (follow "Case-Law" hyper-
link; then follow the "HUDOC" icon; then check the box "Reports" under "ECHR Document
Collections"; then search "Case Title" for "Brannigan"); Brannigan, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. at
577.
136. Brannigan Court decision, supra note 134, at 570-71, 576.
137. Id. at 579, 581-82 (Pettiti, J., dissenting) (arguing that British tradition contra-
dicts the government's argument that the independence of a judge would be compromised
by such a determination); id. at 584-86 (Walsh, J., dissenting) (arguing that the secrecy
the government wished to preserve could also be jeopardized by the habeas corpus pro-
ceedings that the government proposed as a remedy for the applicants).
138. Id. at 584 (Pettiti, J., dissenting); id. at 586 (Walsh, J., dissenting).
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QC. 39 In his 1994 review of the Act's operation, he concluded
thus: "I cannot recommend that a judicial element be intro-
duced. '14' But, by the time he came to review the operation of the
Act in 1999, his view was that "there should be judicial decisions
in the process of extension."1 4'
In Marshall v. United Kingdom, Marshall, having been held in
Castlereagh Holding Centre in East Belfast for six days and two
hours in February 1998 before being released without charge, ar-
gued that at the time of his detention the security situation in
Northern Ireland had improved beyond recognition since the days
when the derogation notice was imposed. 142 Marshall urged the
European Court to apply a "strict scrutiny test" with regard to
the government's claim of an existing public emergency and the
legality of the measures taken thereunder.4 3 However, the Court
unanimously held that the application was "manifestly ill-
founded" because the detention was justified under the deroga-
tion notice." The judges did not think the security situation in
Northern Ireland had sufficiently improved in the almost nine
years since the detentions in Brannigan and McBride to justify a
holding that there was no longer a public emergency threatening
the life of the nation. 145 The court deferred to the assessment
made by the national authorities on this point and on the dangers
of involving Northern Ireland's judiciary in decisions on extend-
ing detention. 1
46
However, by the time the decision in Marshall v. United King-
dom was issued, the derogation notice of 1988 had actually been
139. See John Rowe, Review of the Operation in 2000 of the Prevention of Terrorism
(Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 and the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act
1996, para. 9, http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/ter
rorism-act-2000/terror2000.pdf?view=Binary (indicating years annual reviews were com-
pleted). These reports were submitted to Parliament and to those whom Mr. Rowe had
consulted, but they were not otherwise made easily available.
140. John Rowe, Report on the Operation in 1994 of the Prevention of Terrorism (Tem-
porary Provisions) Act 1989, para. 43.
141. John Rowe, Report on the Operation in 1999 of the Prevention of Terrorism (Tem-
porary Provisions) Act 1989, para. 77.
142. Marshall v. United Kingdom, App. No. 41571/98, at 2, 6 (2001) (Court decision),
available at http://www.echr.coe.int (follow "Case-Law" hyperlink; then follow the
"HUDOC" icon; then check the box "Decisions" under "ECHR Document Collections"; then
search "Application Number" for "41571198").
143. Id. at 6.
144. Id. at 14.
145. Id. at 11-12.
146. Id. at 12-13.
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withdrawn.'47 The British government had issued a Consultation
Paper on the matter in December 1998, at last proposing judicial
participation in applications for extending detention. 48 These
provisions were eventually included in the Terrorism Act 2000
and came into force in February 2001.149 Since then, a person de-
tained under anti-terrorism legislation anywhere in the UK has
had to be brought before a judge no later than forty-eight hours
after being arrested.'5 ° To obtain an extension beyond forty-eight
hours, the police have to satisfy a judge of the following: "(a)
[T]here are reasonable grounds for believing that the further
detention of the person . . . is necessary to obtain . . . or to
preserve relevant evidence, and (b) the investigation in
connection with which the person is detained is being conducted
diligently and expeditiously." 1' The permitted length of the ex-
tensions has since been a matter of great controversy. As far as
the ordinary (non-terrorist) law was concerned, the Police and
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 had already provided that the police
could detain an arrested person for a maximum of thirty-six
hours. 52 If police wanted that period to be extended, they had to
go to a magistrate who could then extend it, in stages no longer
than thirty-six hours, to a maximum of ninety-six hours provided
he or she was persuaded that there were reasonable grounds for
believing this to be necessary in order to secure evidence.5 3 The
ordinary and terrorist laws were, therefore, mostly aligned as far
147. The derogation notice had been specifically set out in the Human Rights Act 1998.
See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, sched. 3, pt. 1. The Human Rights Act 1998 also con-
tains a supplementary notice sent to the Council of Europe on 23 March 1989 to take ac-
count of the replacement of the PTA 1984 by the PTA 1989. See id. The decision in Mar-
shall was issued on 10 July 2001. See Marshall, App. No. 41571198, at 1. As of 1 April
2001, the 1988 derogation was repealed. See Human Rights Act (Amendment) Order,
2001, S.I. 2001/1216, art. 4 (U.K.).
148. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOMELAND DEPARTMENT, LEGISLATION AGAINST
TERRORISM, 1998, Cm. 4178, paras. 8.7-8.9, available at http://www.archive.official-docu
ments.co.uk/document/cm4l/4178/4178.htm.
149. See Terrorism Act, 2000, c .11, § 41(2); id. sched. 8, para. 29.
150. Id. § 41(3).
151. Id. sched. 8, para. 32.
152. Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60, § 42 (Eng.). The equivalent legisla-
tion in Northern Ireland is the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order,
1989, SI 1989/1341 (N. Ir. 12), art. 43. This Order replaced the Magistrates' Courts Act
(Northern Ireland), 1964, c. 21, § 132. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
153. See Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, § 44 (1)-(3) (allowing detention up to
ninety-six hours); id. § 42(1) (authorising extension of detention for the preservation of
evidence). See generally L.H. Leigh, The Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland)
Order 1989: Powers of Arrest and Detention, 40 NILQ 363 (1989).
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as the detainee's right to be brought before a judge was con-
cerned. It was just that in terrorist cases the police had a further
twelve hours in which to question the arrested person before
needing to seek a judicially authorised extension. 15 4
The Terrorism Act 2000 had been in force for just seven months
when the terrible events of 9/11 occurred, but the Anti-terrorism,
Crime and Security Act 2001, passed soon after 9/11, contained
no provisions altering the seven day maximum pre-charge deten-
tion period.'55 In 2003, however, the government quietly doubled
the permitted maximum through a provision in the Criminal Jus-
tice Act.'56 After the bombings in London in July 2005, the police
lobbied the government for an even longer permitted maximum,
citing the difficulties involved in investigating international ter-
rorist networks, de-encrypting numerous computer files and
translating documents from Arabic and other languages. 157 Then-
Prime Minister Tony Blair was in favour of extending the permit-
ted maximum to no fewer than ninety days, which certainly
comes close to internment in anyone's eyes.' In the end, Parlia-
ment accepted only a twenty-eight-day maximum, providing for it
in the Terrorism Act 2006, which was applicable throughout the
UK.159 In 2008, the government-this time under Gordon Brown
as Prime Minister-attempted once again to lengthen the maxi-
mum permitted pre-charge detention period from twenty-eight to
forty-two days.1 60 But, after losing heavily in Parliament's Upper
Chamber, the House of Lords, the government withdrew the pro-
posal from the Counter-Terrorism Bill.'6 ' Supporters of this fur-
ther extension pointed out that in countries such as France,
154. See Terrorism Act 2000, § 41(3) (extending permissible detention period to forty-
eight hours).
155. See Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, § 23.
156. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 306.
157. Letter from Andy Hayman, Assistant Comm'r of the London Metro. Police, to
Charles Clarke, the Home Sec'y (Oct. 6, 2005) available at http://www.privacyinterna
tional.org/issues/terrorism/library/ukterrorbillmetreport.pdf (lobbying for an extension up
to three months).
158. See Andrew Grice & Nigel Morris, Blair Retreats on 90-Day Limit 'At Cost of Secu-
rity', INDEPENDENT (U.K.), Nov. 8, 2005, at 9.
159. Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, § 23(7). But, as under the 2003 Act, no particular ex-
tension can be for longer than seven days. Id. § 23(3).
160. Nicholas Watt, Brown Abandons 42-Day Detention After Lords Defeat (Oct. 14,
2008), http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/oct/13/terrorism-uksecurityl (last visited
Feb. 20, 2009).
161. Id. The forty-two day extension, however, would be held in reserve for a terrorist
emergency. Id.
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where the concept of a "charge" is not really known, pre-trial de-
tention of a terrorist suspect can endure for up to four years.
16 2
Those who were against it, such as Parliament's Joint Committee
on Human Rights and the independent Equality and Human
Rights Commission, relied on dicta in European Court jurispru-
dence to suggest that the Court would not tolerate such lengthy
pre-charge detentions in common-law countries.'63 The Joint
Committee believes that hearings at which applications for ex-
tensions are considered are not properly adversarial, as required
by Article 5(4) of the European Convention, because the suspect
can be excluded and denied access to information that goes before
the judge. 64 However, the only European Court authority cited
for this is Garcia Alva v. Germany, where the issue was the legal-
ity of the original arrest and detention on remand, not whether
extended detention was justified. 65 In addition, the Court in Gar-
cia Alva conceded that not all information had to be disclosed to
the suspect.
166
For the time being, one can only guess the attitude likely to be
adopted by the European Court regarding lengthy pre-charge de-
tentions. On its face, the wording of the European Convention
suggests that the European Court will not find it easy to impose
time limits in the way that it has done for the Article 5(3) obliga-
162. FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, COUNTER-TERRORISM LEGISLATION AND
PRACTICE: A SURVEY OF SELECTED COUNTRIES 9-10 (2005), http://www.fco.gov.uk/resourc
es/en/pdf/4175218/counter-terrorism-Oct05.
163. See JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS (TWELFTH REPORT): ANNUAL RENEWAL OF 28 DAYS 2008, 2007-8, H.L.
132/H.C. 825, at 13-17; Equality and Human Rights Commission, Counter-Terrorism Bill:
House of Commons, Report Stage, 10 June 2008, http://www.equalityhumanrights.comlen/
policyresearch/briefings/Pages/CounterTerrorismBillamendments.aspx (last visited Feb.
20, 2009) (announcing opposition to the extension). The Equality and Human Rights
Commission relied on the advice of Rabinder Singh QC and Professor Aileen McColgan,
who relied heavily on European Court cases. See RABINDER SINGH & AILEEN MCCOLGAN,
IN THE MATTER OF PRE-CHARGE DETENTION UNDER THE COUNTER-TERRORISM BILL, 22-40
(2008), http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/Documents/Legislation/CTBamend.pdf.
164. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS (THIRTEENTH REPORT): COUNTER-TERRORISM BILL, 2007-8, H.L. 172/H.C. 1077 at
18.
165. Id. at 18; see Garcia Alva v. Germany, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 335, 350, 353 (2001)
(Court decision); see also Nikolova v. Bulgaria, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 64, 69-72, 83-87 (1999)
(Court decision) (challenging detention on remand); Lamy v. Belgium, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep.
529, 530-33, 540 (1989) (Court decision) (challenging arrest and detention on remand).
These decisions, because they concern remands in custody within civil law systems, are
not necessarily applicable to situations involving pre-charge detention within common law
systems.
166. Garcia Alva, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 353.
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tion to bring a detained person promptly before a judge. 167 If the
Court follows the approach it has adopted regarding pre-trial de-
tentions, outlined in Part II of this article, it may well hesitate to
set limits to pre-charge detention in terms of the permitted max-
imum number of days. Rather, it may prefer to allow states to
take account of contextual factors such as the nature of the al-
leged offence, the complexity of the attendant investigation, and
the other safeguards which are traditional features of the legal
system under examination.
V. DETENTION AT PORTS AND AIRPORTS
Article 5 of the European Convention permits detention in a
number of situations other than when a person is reasonably sus-
pected of involvement in a criminal offence.16 Article 5(1)(b) lists
one such permissive detention as a detention "in order to secure
the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law."'69 Under one
reading, this authorises detention in any situation where a per-
son does not comply with the law. Fortunately, the European
Court has stressed that the key words in the sub-paragraph are
"to secure the fulfilment" of any obligation: the arrest must occur
to enable the obligation to be carried out, not to punish a person
for not carrying it out.1 70 With regard to the conflict in Northern
Ireland, Article 5(1)(b) was relevant in relation to the obligation,
under the PTA 1974, to submit oneself to an "examination" if re-
quested to do so by officials at a port or airport. 71 The PTA 1974
originally imposed this requirement but it was first considered in
Strasbourg when the relevant Act was the 1976 successor to that
Act. 72 The Prevention of Terrorism (Supplemental Temporary
Provisions) Order 1976 empowered "examining officers" to exam-
167. Compare European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 27, art. 5(4), with
id. art. 5(3).
168. See, e.g., id. art. 5(1)(b), (d)-(f).
169. Id. art. 5(1)(b).
170. See Nowicka v. Poland, App. No. 30218/96, para. 60 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 3, 2002),
available at http://www.echr.coe.int (follow "Case-Law" hyperlink; then follow the
"HUDOC" icon; then check the box "Judgments" under "ECHR Document Collections";
then search "Case Title" for "Nowicka").
171. See Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1974, c. 56, § 8 & sched. 3; see also Prevention of
Terrorism (Supplemental Temporary Provisions) Order, 1974, S.I. 1974/1975, art. 4 (U.K.);
Prevention of Terrorism (Supplemental Temporary Provisions) (Northern Ireland) Order,
1974, SI 1974/2038, art. 4 (N. Ir.).
172. See Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1976, c. 8, § 13 sched. 3.
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ine persons for the purpose of determining three things: (1)
whether they appeared to be or to have been concerned in the
"commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism"; (2)
whether they were the subject of an "exclusion order"; and (3)
whether there were grounds for suspecting that the persons had
committed one of a number of offences listed elsewhere in the
PTA 1976.173 "Examining officers" were usually police officers
working in the "Special Branch," or customs and excise officers. 
174
Article 6 of the Order went on to impose a duty on persons being
examined to furnish the examining officer with all such informa-
tion as he or she may require.17 Article 7 permitted the searching
of people being examined, and Article 10 permitted their deten-
tion (pending their examination or pending consideration of
whether they should be issued with an exclusion order) for a pe-
riod of up to two days on the authorisation of an examining officer
and for up to five more days if the Secretary of State so di-
rected. 176 Another provision in the PTA 1976 stated that where a
person was detained under Article 10, any examining officer, con-
stable, or prison officer could take "all such steps as may be rea-
sonably necessary for photographing, measuring or otherwise
identifying [him or her] .177
An attempt was made in the English courts to challenge the
use of these port powers in In re Boyle, O'Hare, and McAllister,
but it failed. 17 The Divisional Court admitted that the wording of
the legislation was quite explicit; the only basis for a successful
173. Prevention of Terrorism (Supplemental Temporary Provisions) Order, 1976, S.I.
1976/465, art. 5 (U.K.) [hereinafter Prevention of Terrorism Order (U.K.)]; Prevention of
Terrorism (Supplemental Temporary Provisions) (Northern Ireland) Order, 1976, SI
1976/466, art. 5 (N. Ir.) [hereinafter Prevention of Terrorism Order (N. Ir.)]. An "exclusion
order" excluded someone from Northern Ireland or the United Kingdom, or excluded
someone from entering or leaving Northern Ireland from, or to go to, the Republic of Ire-
land. See Prevention of Terrorism Order (U.K.), art. 2; Prevention of Terrorism Order (N.
Ir.), arts. 2, 5(2). A full discussion of exclusion orders is beyond the scope of this article.
174. See Prevention of Terrorism Order (U.K.), supra note 173, art. 4; Prevention of
Terrorism Order (N. Ir.), supra note 173, art. 4.
175. Prevention of Terrorism Order (U.K.), supra note 173, art. 6; Prevention of Terror-
ism Order (N. Ir.), supra note 173, art. 6.
176. Prevention of Terrorism Order (U.K.), supra note 173, arts. 7(2), 10; Prevention of
Terrorism Order (N. Ir.), supra note 173, arts. 2, 5(2).
177. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1976, c. 8, sched. 3, para.
5(3).
178. See EARL JELLICOE, HOME DEPARTMENT, REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE
PREVENTION OF TERRORISM (TEMPORARY PROVISIONS) ACT 1976, 1983, Cmnd. 8803, at 46-
47 [hereinafter JELLICOE].
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challenge against these port powers, said the Court, would be a
showing of bad faith on the part of the examining officer-a very
difficult thing to prove. 179
A challenge to the detention powers was then mounted in
Strasbourg. In McVeigh, O'Neill, and Evans v. United Kingdom,
the European Commission addressed the position of three men
who, returning to Liverpool by ferry from a 1977 holiday in Ire-
land, were detained for forty-five hours for the purposes of ex-
amination under the 1976 Order."' ° During that time, they were
questioned, searched, photographed and fingerprinted, but were
ultimately not issued with an exclusion order or charged with any
offence."' 1 The European Commission declared the applications
admissible after finding that exhaustion of other domestic reme-
dies would not have offered any chance of redress. 8 2 But, in its
report on the merits of the applications, adopted on 18 March
1981, the Commission expressed the opinion, almost unani-
mously, that there had been no breach of Article 5.183 The only
part of the complaint that was upheld-as a breach of Article 8
and by twelve votes to two-was the alleged failure to allow two
of the applicants to contact their wives while they were de-
tained.8 4 The British government contested that these two appli-
cants had in fact requested that their wives be contacted8 5 but to
avoid future doubt the government enacted section 62 of the
Criminal Law Act 1977 to ensure that there would be a full re-
cord of all requests for notification of detention (and also a full re-
cord of the reasons for any refusal of such immediate notifica-
tion). 86
The Commission stated that it found "much force" in the appli-
cants' argument that Article 5(1)(b) could be invoked as a justifi-
cation for detention only if a person had voluntarily refused to
179. See id. at 47.
180. See McVeigh v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 8022/77, 8025/77, 8027/77 5 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 82-83 (1981) (Commission report).
181. Id. at 82-84.
182. X v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 8022/77, 8025/77, 8027/77 (Dec. 8, 1979) (Com-
mission decision), available at http://www.echr.coe.int (follow "Case-Law" hyperlink; then
follow the "HUDOC" icon; then check the box "Decisions" under "ECHR Document Collect-
ions"; then search "Application Number" for "8022/77").
183. McVeigh, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 99.
184. Id. at 106-08.
185. Id. at 85.
186. Id. at 81; see Criminal Law Act, 1977, c. 45, § 62.
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comply with the obligation in question."l 7 In the Commission's
opinion, Article 5(1)(b) "is primarily intended ... to cover the case
where the law permits detention as a coercive measure to induce
a person to perform a specific obligation which he has wilfully or
negligently failed to perform hitherto."' 8 But it went on to ob-
serve that the wording of the sub-paragraph "does not expressly
require that there should have been such deliberate or negligent
failure on the part of the detainee."" 9 In addition, there must be
"specific circumstances such as to warrant the use of detention as
a means of securing the fulfilment of an obligation before deten-
tion on this ground can be justified."9 ' On the facts of this case,
the Commission thought that the provisions in the PTA 1976 and
the Order made thereunder "create[d] an overall obligation, aris-
ing in specified circumstances, to submit to 'examination' and
that it was "a specific and concrete obligation."'' The Commission
added:
The importance in present-day conditions of controlling the interna-
tional movement of terrorists has been widely recognised in Western
Europe, in particular by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe. In the particular context of the United Kingdom there is also
evident importance in controlling and detecting the movement of ter-
rorists not only between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ire-
land but also between Great Britain and Ireland as a whole, including
Northern Ireland. The necessary checks must obviously be carried out
as the person concerned enters or leaves the territory in question and
there is a legitimate need to obtain immediate fulfilment of the obliga-
tion to submit to such checks.
1 92
Following the production of the Commission's report, neither
the Commission nor the British government referred the case to
the European Court, so the Committee of Ministers at the Council
of Europe considered it instead.'93 The Committee endorsed all
the Commission's views and, based on changes introduced by sec-
tion 62 of the Criminal Law Act 1977, decided that no further ac-
187. McVeigh, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 92.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 93. The requirement of a "specific and concrete obligation" derives from En-
gel v. Netherlands, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 647, 672 (1976) (Court decision).
192. McVeigh, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 97 (internal citation omitted).
193. At the time of McVeigh, if a case was not referred to the European Court, the
Committee of Ministers heard the case. See EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
TEXTS AND DOCUMENTS art. 32 (Herbert Miehsler & Herbert Petzold eds., 1982).
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tion needed to be taken in the case. 194 An official review of the
PTA 1976 published in 1978 had endorsed the continued use of
the port powers,' 95 as did a second review published in 1983.196 In
response to a recommendation in the 1983 review, however, the
Order made under the PTA 1984 provided that a person could not
be examined at a port for longer than twelve hours unless an ex-
amining officer had "reasonable grounds for suspecting that the
person examined is or has been concerned in the commission,
preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism," in which case the
person could be required to submit to further examination. 19 7
While the McVeigh case concerned three men who were trying
to enter Great Britain, a man later challenged the port powers af-
ter being detained while trying to leave Great Britain.' 98 In 1985,
police held Paul Lyttle in the Scottish port of Stranraer for thirty-
one hours.'99 Not surprisingly, the European Commission adopted
exactly the same approach as it had done in McVeigh and ruled
the application inadmissible.2 °0 The Commission pointed out that
Lyttle could have challenged his detention by bringing habeas
corpus proceedings.20 ' There had not, therefore, been a breach of
Article 5(4) of the European Convention, which guarantees every-
one deprived of his or her liberty by arrest or detention the right
to challenge the lawfulness of that detention.2 2
The McVeigh and Lyttle cases raise fundamental questions
about the degree to which, in practice, the European Convention
can protect people against arbitrary arrest. For that reason alone,
194. McVeigh, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 111-13 (Committee of Ministers Resolution, Mar. 24,
1982).
195. LORD SHACKLETON, REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM
(TEMPORARY PROVISIONS) ACTS 1974 AND 1976, Cmnd. 7324, at 46-47.
196. JELLICOE, supra note 178, at 55.
197. Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism (Supplemental Temporary Provisions)
Order, 1984, S.I. 1984/418, art. 4(2) (U.K.); Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism
(Supplemental Temporary Provisions) (Northern Ireland) Order, 1984, art. 4(5) (N. Ir.).
Earl Jellicoe's 1983 review recommended that "[an examining officer should lose the right
to examine (and detain) a passenger twelve hours after the start of examination unless he
has by that time formed a reasonable suspicion of one of the matters in section 12(1) of the
Prevention of Terrorism Act." JELLICOE, supra note 178, at 93.
198. Lyttle v. United Kingdom, App. No. 11650/85, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 381, 381 (1987)
(Commission decision).
199. Id. at 382.
200. Id. at 384.
201. Id. at 385.
202. Id.; see European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 27, art. 5(4).
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it is regrettable that neither case benefited from consideration by
the European Court. The legal position in the UK was left inter-
nally inconsistent: while people could not be arrested on the
streets unless there was some reasonable suspicion that they
were involved in terrorism, they could be arrested at ports and
airports even though they were full UK citizens and were not ini-
tially suspected of anything. To its credit, the European Commis-
sion stressed in McVeigh that the detention in that case had
lasted forty-five hours, thereby leaving open the question whether
detentions for longer periods would be justifiable.2"3 If the Euro-
pean Court, as we saw in Brogan,204 views four days as the maxi-
mum permitted period of detention under Article 5(3), which uses
the term "promptly" in relation to detentions falling under Article
5(1)(c), it should not tolerate a longer maximum for detentions
falling under Article 5(1)(b), even though the term "promptly" is
not used there.20 5 Article 5(1)(c) is about detention on "reasonable
suspicion of having committed an offence."0 6 Article 5(1)(b), on
the other hand, is about detention intended to "secure the fulfil-
ment of any obligation prescribed by law."20 7 The reasons for im-
posing strict time limits on the former kind of detention apply
every bit as much, if not more so, to the latter kind of detention.
The port powers remained in place until February 2001, when
sections 53 and 97 of, and Schedule 7 to, the Terrorism Act 2000
came into force. 20 ' These permitted examining officers to question
a person at a port or airport, or near the border between
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, to determine
whether he or she appeared to be someone who is or has been
concerned in the commission, preparation, or instigation of acts of
terrorism.2 9 A person detained for such questioning can be held
for no more than nine hours, and if the questioning takes place at
a police station, the detainee has the benefit of the same rights
(e.g., as regards the audio- and video-recording of the interview)
203. See McVeigh v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 8022/77, 8025/77, 8027/77, 5 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 71, 98 (1981) (Commission Decision).
204. See Brogan Court decision, supra note 114, 135-36.
205. See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 27, arts. 5(3), 5(1)(b).
206. See id. art. 5(1)(c).
207. See id. art. 5(1)(b).
208. See Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, §§ 53, 97, sched. 7.
209. Id. sched. 7, paras. 2-4; id. § 40(1)(b) (defining terrorist). Under the Act, "port"
includes any airport. See id. sched. 7, para. 1(2).
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as someone who is questioned on suspicion of terrorism.21 ° If the
examining officer wants the person detained for longer than nine
hours, the conditions applicable to all terrorist suspects must be
satisfied. n
VI. DETENTION TO QUESTION OR SEARCH
Emergency legislation in Northern Ireland again brought into
focus detention for the purpose of securing the fulfilment of an ob-
ligation prescribed by law by conferring stop and question powers
on the police and army.
Starting with section 16 of the EPA 1973, a person could be ar-
rested in Northern Ireland for failing to answer certain questions
when stopped (whether on foot or in a vehicle) by a police officer
or soldier.212 The provision was re-enacted several times through-
out the period of the civil unrest in Northern Ireland and was ul-
timately enacted as section 89 of the Terrorism Act 2000.213 This
section did not cease to have the force of law in Northern Ireland
until 31 July 2007214 and it was replaced on 1 August 2007 by the
similarly worded section 21 of the Justice and Security (Northern
Ireland) Act 2007, which is still in force.215 Section 89 allowed a
police officer or soldier to stop a person
for so long as is necessary to question him to ascertain (a) his or her
identity and movements, (b) what he [or she] knows about a recent
explosion or another recent incident endangering life; [and] (c) what
he [or she] knows about a person killed or injured in a recent explo-
sion or incident.
216
210. See id. sched. 7, para. 6(4); id. sched. 8, para. 3.
211. See id. sched. 8, para. 32(1). A judicial authority may only extend detention if he
or she is satisfied that "there are reasonable grounds for believing that the further deten-
tion of the person ... is necessary to obtain relevant evidence whether by questioning him
or otherwise or to preserve relevant evidence." Id.
212. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1973, c. 53 § 16.
213. Terrorism Act 2000, § 89.
214. Terrorism (Northern Ireland) Act, 2006, c. 4, § 1(1)-(2).
215. See Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act, 2007, c. 6, §§ 21, 53(1). The main
difference between this and section 89 of the Terrorism Act 2000 is that the 2007 provision
allows only soldiers (not police officers) to ask questions relating to the matters listed un-
der subsections (b) and (c) in section 89. See id. § 21(2); Terrorism Act 2000, § 89(1). As
soldiers are not currently deployed in Northern Ireland this in effect means that such
questions are no longer posed when people in Northern Ireland are stopped in the street.
216. Terrorism Act 2000, § 89(1).
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It was an offence, punishable in 2000 (and up until the section's
repeal) with a fine of up to £5,000, to refuse to stop when required
to do so under this section, to refuse to answer questions ad-
dressed under the section, or to refuse to answer questions to the
best of one's knowledge and ability.217
Despite the very extensive use of this power throughout the
years of conflict in Northern Ireland, its compatibility with Arti-
cle 5(1)(b) of the European Convention was never fully tested in
either the domestic courts or the European Court. It is arguable
that the obligation in question is not "specific and concrete," as
required by Engel v. Netherlands, because terms such as "move-
ments" and "recent" are so vague.218 Whether there were specific
circumstances in Northern Ireland justifying the use of the power
is also dubious, since it applied in all places and at all times,
without reference to any particular goal other than the unstated
one of disrupting the movements of terrorists within Northern
Ireland. In retrospect, it is difficult to make any assessment of
whether the existence and/or use of the power did in fact appre-
ciably assist the security forces in their fight against the terror-
ists; no official statistics were ever published on how often infor-
mation obtained by use of this power led to someone being
convicted of a crime associated with terrorism. There is some an-
ecdotal evidence on the other side of the line, however, showing
that excessive use of the power, in a manner which was harass-
ment to some, so alienated parts of the community in Northern
Ireland that it made the security forces' efforts to defeat terrorism
more difficult.219
The Terrorism Act 2000 contained a new power, going beyond
anything then present in Northern Ireland's law, that allowed po-
lice officers anywhere in the UK to stop a person or vehicle and
carry out a search "for articles of a kind which could be used in
connection with terrorism."22 The Act explicitly states that the
217. See id. § 89(2) (imposing a level 5 fine); Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Or-
der, 1994, SI 1994/2795, art. 3(2) (N. Ir. 15) (setting level 5 fines at £5,000). Failure to
comply with section 21 of the Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007 is still pun-
ishable with a level 5 fine. Id. § 21(4).
218. See Engel v. Netherlands, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 647, 672 (1976) (Court decision).
219. See ROBBIE MCVEIGH, "IT'S PART OF LIFE HERE...": THE SECURITY FORCES AND
HARASSMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND 192 (1994) (stating that "there is little evidence that
[emergency legislation] contributes to effective policing").
220. Terrorism Act 2000, § 45(1)(a); see also id. § 44(1)-(2).
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power may be exercised "whether or not the constable has
grounds for suspecting the presence of articles of that kind."22'
The furthest the law in Northern Ireland had gone prior to this
was to allow any police officer or soldier on duty to search without
suspicion any premises other than a dwelling-house for explo-
sives, firearms, ammunition or wireless apparatus.222 However,
the 2000 Act did require the use of the new power to be author-
ised in advance for a particular area by a senior police officer who
"considers it expedient for the prevention of acts of terrorism."223
The authorisation has to be confirmed by the Secretary of State
within forty-eight hours and may not last for longer than twenty-
eight days.224 Unknown to most people (because it was given no
publicity), the use of the power was authorised for the whole of
London by the Assistant Commander of the Metropolitan Police
immediately after the 2000 Act came into force and this authori-
sation was continuously renewed every twenty-eight days there-
after with the Secretary of State's approval.225
In September 2003, two people who were stopped and searched
under the power sought declarations that the authorisations were
unlawful, but they failed in every court, including the House of
Lords.226 The Lords recognized the significance of the police power
but said that Parliament had subjected it to enough constraints to
make it a lawful and proportionate interference with people's
rights to a private life, freedom of speech, and freedom of associa-
tion. 2 7 Moreover, the power did not engage the right to liberty be-
cause the brief detention involved did not amount to a depriva-
tion of liberty. 22 This power manifests a very realistic approach
to a real-life problem. As the Lords made clear, although a police
officer did not need to have any suspicion before stopping and
221. Id. § 45(l)(b).
222. See id. § 84, sched. 10, para. 2 (requiring reasonable suspicion only for entering
dwellings). These provisions, with the rest of the Terrorism Act 2000, lapsed on 31 July
2007. See Terrorism (Northern Ireland) Act, 2006, c. 4, § 1(1)-(2). However, similar lan-
guage is found in the Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007, in force from 1
August 2007. See Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act, 2007, c. 6, §§ 24, 53(1),
sched. 3, para. 2.
223. Terrorism Act 2000, § 44(3).
224. Id. § 46(1)-(4).
225. See R v. Comm'r of Police of the Metropolis [2006] UKHL 12, [2006] 2 A.C. 307,
339 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K).
226. Id. at 332, 309-10.
227. Id. at 344-45.
228. Id. at 343.
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searching a member of the public, the officer could not stop and
search people "who [were] obviously not terrorist suspects. 229 Yet,
worry remains that such an approach may legitimate racial or re-
ligious profiling, a point Lord Bingham specifically refused to ad-
dress.230 Such profiling led to accusations of harassment in
Northern Ireland.231
VII. CONCLUSION
During the last forty years, there has been no shortage of
imagination applied to devising forms of terrorism-related deten-
tion in Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK. For four shame-
ful years (1971-75), detention without trial occurred in Northern
Ireland, 232 and for three more (2001-04) it occurred in London.2 33
The European Court of Human Rights held the former to be le-
gitimate, 234 but the House of Lords ruled the latter to be contrary
to the European Convention. 235 Denied the luxury of locking sus-
pects up without trial, the authorities were instead given other
tools to prevent and punish terrorism. In Northern Ireland one of
the main arrest powers required the police to have only "suspi-
cion," not "reasonable suspicion," and this did not fully change
until the entry into force of the relevant sections of the Northern
Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1987 in June 1987.236
Throughout the UK, from 1974 until 2001, the police could hold
those arrested on suspicion (or, from 1984, reasonable suspicion)
of terrorism for up to seven days without bringing them before a
229. Id. at 346-37 (per Lord Bingham). The learned judge added, perhaps with some
degree of circularity, that the lack of any requirement to premise the stop and search on
suspicion "is to ensure that a constable is not deterred from stopping and searching a per-
son whom he does suspect as a potential terrorist by the fear that he could not show rea-
sonable grounds for his suspicion." Id. at 347.
230. Id. at 347 ("1 prefer to say nothing on the subject of discrimination."). Lord Hope,
however, did address discrimination and, while not discounting the risk, concluded that
discriminatory use was not inevitable. Id. at 347-49 (per Lord Hope).
231. See MCVEIGH, supra note 219, at 138-44.
232. See supra Part II.A.
233. See supra Part II.B.
234. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 93-94 (1978) (Court decision).
235. A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't [2004] UKHL 56, [20051 2 A.C. 68, 127 (ap-
peal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
236. See Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1973, c. 53, §§ 10(1), 11(1),
12(1); Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1987, c. 30, § 25(1), sched. 1.
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judge or charging them.2 37 A government minister authorised the
last five days of such detention-a sort of mini-internment.238
When, in 1988, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that
Article 5 of the European Convention normally required pre-
charge detention to last no longer than four days, the UK gov-
ernment immediately issued a notice derogating from that Arti-
cle.2 39 Five years later, the European Court held that this was a
valid derogation. 240 The government eventually withdrew the
derogation in 2001 when the UK government enacted a system
(even in Northern Ireland) whereby persons arrested on reason-
able suspicion of involvement in terrorism had to be brought be-
fore a judge within forty-eight hours.241 Then, a judge-not a gov-
ernment minister-could extend the detention up to seven days
total.242 In 2003, the government doubled the maximum pre-
charge detention period to fourteen days and, three years later,
again doubled it to twenty-eight days.243 In 2008, the government
attempted to increase the permitted maximum to forty-two days
but withdrew the proposal after strong opposition in Parlia-
ment.244
As regards post-charge detention, trials in England and Wales
have to take place within fairly strict time limits unless the
prosecution can persuade a judge to extend those limits. 24 5 No
such time limits exist in Northern Ireland.246 Throughout the UK,
however, if the prosecution wishes to keep the suspect in custody
pending the trial, the prosecution bears the burden of showing
why the court should not grant bail.247 There is, in practice, an
assumption that the court will grant bail.248
237. See Detention of Terrorists (Northern Ireland) Order, 1972, SI 1972/1632 (N. Ir.
15), art. 4.
238. See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
239. See Brogan Court decision, supra note 114, at 136; Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42,
sched. 2, pt. I (repealed by Human Rights 1998 (Amendment) Order, 2001, S.I. 2001/1216
(U.K.)).
240. See Brannigan Court decision, supra note 134, at 577.
241. See Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 41(3).
242. See id. sched. 8, para. 36.
243. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 306(4); Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, § 23(7).
244. See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
246. See Prosecution of Offences Act, 1985, c. 23, § 31(7).
247. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
248. Id.
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In addition, other types of detention remain available. The po-
lice may detain people on the streets to search them or their be-
longings, provided only that the requisite police authority for
such measures has been given.249 Before 31 July 2007, the police
could stop and question people on the streets of Northern Ireland
about terrorist incidents, and the police can still stop people to
ask them to identify themselves and to give an account of their
movements. ° The House of Lords has held that such short-term
detentions do not amount to "a deprivation of liberty" for the pur-
poses of Article 5 of the European Convention.251' The police also
may detain people at ports or airports without any suspicion at
all, albeit for just nine hours.252 Finally, where a person who is
reasonably suspected of involvement in terrorism cannot be
prosecuted because there is not enough admissible evidence to
put before a court, or cannot be deported because he or she would
be at substantial risk of being subjected to torture or inhuman or
degrading treatment in his or her home country, a UK govern-
ment minister can, with the approval of a judge, issue a "control
order" which may severely restrict the movements of the con-
trolee.253 If the restrictions are so severe as to amount to a depri-
vation of liberty, the minister can apply to a court for a "derogat-
ing" control order, which would require a derogation notice to be
lodged with the Secretary General of the Council of Europe.254 To
date, no government minister has applied for any such derogating
orders. If and when they do, judges will certainly scrutinize the
derogating order carefully, both domestically and in Strasbourg.
As the Council of Europe itself has recently devised new Conven-
tions in the realm of terrorism,25' the European Court, when faced
with challenges to control orders on human rights grounds, will
no doubt bear in mind the very real difficulties governments face
249. See supra notes 172-76 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 212-17 and accompanying text; see also Justice and Security
(Northern Ireland) Act, 2007, c. 6, § 21(1) (allowing a constable to stop persons to question
to ascertain identity and movements).
251. See supra notes 226-29 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
253. See Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2, §§ 1-4.
254. See id. § 4.
255. See, e.g., Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, May 16,
2005, C.E.T.S. 196; Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism, May 16, 2005,
C.E.T.S. 198.
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in preventing terrorism in the modern world. The European
Court's experience in handling many cases from Northern Ireland
will stand it in good stead in that regard.
